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SatomiTani   
Sincethelastgeneralelectionheldin2003，nOt a fewjournalists and  
COlumnists have mentioned“the era of a two－party SySteminJapan”．  
Someresearchershastilyassertsthattheold1955systemhasbeenfinally  
replaced by a new system called20〔13system．According to such an  
argument，the upheavalofJapanese party politics since1993has been  
finally settled down，replaced by a new system．ln this so－Called2003  
SyStem，theLDP，theLiberalDemocraticPartyistendtobeseenasstill  
leading，butitisnotsopowerfulasitwasbefore1993．Whatisfollowing  
after the LDPis the DPJ，Democratic Party ofJapan．TheDPJis still  




isit agenuine two・partySyStem？Orisit a disguiseddominant party  
SyStemWiththepredominantLDPthatsurvivedtheupheavalsince1993？  
The purpose of this smallarticleis to answer such questions using  
aggregatedata．  
1．The Endofthe1955System   
Beforetalkingab（〕utWhetherwearereallyhavinganewpartysystem，  
however，Iwouldlike tolook back at the demise of the so－Cal1ed1955  
SyStem．Needlesstosay，Japanwasonceregardedasprimeexampleofa  
dominant party system，Or a“SpeCialbrand of dominant party  
pluralism，1）”asits dominant party，the LDP continued to monopolize  
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power forthirty－eight yearsfrom1955through1993．Itisnatural，there－  
fore，thatenormousenergyhasbeenconsumedtounderstandthepower  
Shiftin1993and the following development ofJapanese politics．The  
booksthatIamtryingtoreviewherearethetwo ofthemostexcellent  
works that tackle this difficult task．  
Generallyspeaking，thenumerousattemptstoexplaintheupheavalof   
Japanesepoliticsinandafter1993canbeclassifiedintothreegroups．The  
firstgroupconsistsofthosewhofocusonmicroscopicfactorssuchasthe  
aspirations，taCtics，andstrategiestakenbypoliticalactors．Mostjournal－   
isticexplanationsfallintothiscategory．Needlesstosay，manypOlitical  
SCientists havealso analyzed eventsin this manner．Among these，a  
research group led by Sasaki provides comprehensive information and 
Variousanalysesabout“politicalreform”from1988through1994（1999）2）．  
Their aimis to describe and explain the whole process of the fierce  
politicalbattleindetail．Curtis’sanalysisinthislinegivesusancompel－   
1ingexplanationofthemetamorphosisofJapanesepartypoliticsinthose  





LDPin1993by focusing on theincentives of politicians and the con－  
Straints surroundingthem5）．AccordingtoKohno，Or the rational－Choice  
theoristsin general，pOliticians are always preoccupied by their own  
reelection，andrationallycalculatewhichalternativewillbemosteffec－  
1）Michio MuramatsuandEllisS．Krauss，“TheDominant Party and SocialCoali－   
tionsinJapan，”inT．］．Pempe1ed．，771e One－nlr＆Domtnant Regimes．Ithaca，NY：   
CornellUniversity Press，1990，p．304．  
2）SasakiTakeshied．，Seヴl’KaLkaku Sen－hqfhaku－nlchino Sinjifsu（Examining   
PoliticalReformArguedforl．800daysanditsEffectsonJapanesePolitics），Tokyo：   
Koudan－Sha，1999．  
3）GeraldCurtis，771eLogicdhPanesePolttics：LeadeYS，Institutionsandae   
〆Change．NewYork：ColumbiaUniversity Press，1999，  
4）Ray Christensen，Ending the LDP Hqe7ナ10ny：Ebrわ′ Coope7tltionin Man   
Honolulu：Universityof HawaiiPress，2000．  
5）Masaru Kohno，JL4）antIbstwarlbr＆Iblitics，Ch，8．Princeton，NewJersey：   
PrincetonUniversityPress，1997，  
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and other unexpected politicalchangesin the1990s，aS WPllas the  
so・CalledbubbleTburstandthepoorperformanceoftheJapanes¢economy  
inthesame decade，aS the resultof a“reglme”transformatibn6）．Then  
Ohtake explains the chaotic situation after1993by analyz抽g a tidal  
Changeoftheideologicalenvironment7）．   
ThecontextofinternationalpoliticsinwhichtheJapanes¢political  
SyStemisputisalsoseenasimportant．Sasakialsopointsintheintroduc－  
tionto his book to the ending ofthe cold war which forcedJapanese  
POliticians to realize theineffectiveness ofthe existing politicalframe－  
WOrk，and made them decide to sailon the roughsea of“political  
reform”8）．Stockwinthinks ofthe GulfCrisisthat quickly followed the  




thisgroup，however，that explaintheending oftheJapanese dominant  
partysystembecausethecollapseoftheLDPadministrationin1993was  
notcausedastheresultofagcneralelection，butbythesplittingofthe  
LDP．However，itis undeniable that politicians’concern about voters’  
Opinionhassomc，ifnotexclusive，effectsontheirstrategiesandtactics．  
Inthisscnse，itmaybearguablethatvoters7politicalattitudesindirectly  
attributed to the co11apse of the one－party dominant system．Research  
6）T．J．Pempel，Regime Shift：Co，ゆaYt2tivc Lb／11amics Q／lhe jqDanese Political   
Econo∽γ．Ithaca，NY：CornellUniversity Press，1998．  
7）HideoOhtake，Ni抄On SeHino771t7itsuJ＊u：93．－nenlkn抑フSeihen noNaha de  
（The Axis of ConflictinJapanese Politics：PoliticalRealignment since19g3）．   
Tokyo：Chuo Koron－Sha，1999．  
8）Sasaki，qt・，Cit．，pp．6－9．  
9）J．A．A．Stockwin，GoverningJ4）an，thirdeditio11，p．77．Oxford，UK：Blackwell   
PublishersInc．，1999．  
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doneby TanakaandbyKabashimasuggeststhepossiblefruitfulnessof  
SuChanapproachlO）．  
2．A New PartySysteminJapan？  
Whatevertheexplanationofityoumayprovide，Onethingiscertain：  
The1955system has passed away forever．My task hereis to try to  
answerthequestionofwhatkindofpartysystemisreplacingtheoldone．  
Has the new system real］y been crystallized？Or the environment of  
politicalpartiesisstillfluid？Inordertoanswerthisquestion，Iwouldlike  
to derive three possible explanations frorn Tableland Tablc2，and  






the present electoralsystem has a PR tier．The effective number of  
partiesisstillabittoolargetodiscusstheadventofatwo－partySyStem．  
Besides，theseat－SharedistributionshownonTablelandTablc2resem－  
b］esto that oftoday’sGermany．Ofcoursc，this representseachparty’s  
forceonlyinthePRtier．IntheSMDtier，therealityismuchharsherto  
Tablel Transition of the Number of Parties as Parliamentary Caucuses  
（‘‘Kaiha”）■  
Aug．15，2000   Dec．20．2003   
ActualN   
8  
9   5   
EffectiveN  乙98  3．15   2．40   
四  ●Calculatedbyeachkaiha’sshareofseats，  
10）AijiTanaka，“KokuminlshikiniokeruGojugonen Taiseino Henyo to Hokai，’  
（The TraHSformation and Collapse of the1955SystemirlVoters’Minds）．In Go－   
jLmnen772ise［no Hokai（TheEndofthe1955System），ed．TheJapanesePol王tical   
ScienceAssociation．Tokyo：lwanamiShoten．  
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Table2 ShareofVotesintheNationwidePRTier（％）  
NFP  28．04   
DPJ   16．10  25．18  37．38   
CGP  12，97   14．77   
JCP  13．06  11．23  7．75   
SDP   6．38   9．36   5．12   
NHP   1．05  
LIB  11．01  
CON  0．41   ◆   
．TheConservativeParty rannocandidateinthePRblocks．  
Smallparties．In thelast election，theJCP won no seat on the district  
level．TheSDPgainedonlyone．Thus，themulti－partySCenariodoesnot  
lookverypromising．ButIdonotcompletelyexcludethispossibilityright  
aWay．   
Thesecond possibilityis thatJapanis adopting a two－party SyStem．  
Such a viewis foundin many articles and columns．Itis true that the  





andeffectivenumberofpartiessharplydeclinedin2003・TheDemocrats 二  
nowhavethirty・SeVenperCentOfseatsintheHouseofRepresentatives， 四  
SurpaSSingtheLDPinPR．1tisthelargestsharethatapartyotherthan  
the LDP has ever achieved since1955．On the other hand，tWO tiny  
COnSerVative parties disappeared．Twoleft－Wing parties survived the  
electionanyway，butunderwentaserioussetback．Thus，itispossibleto  
SaythatJapanhasnowatwo－PartySySteminabroadsense，ifnotapure  
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upwiththeLDPtoday．The CGPneedstostayalliedwiththeLDPfor  
a certain religious reason，Or SeCtarianinterest that politicalscientists  
Seldommention．TheLDP，Ontheotherhand，desperatelyneedstheCGP  
tokeepitselfabovewaterinmetropolitanareasandinsomeurbanareas．   
Itisarguable，therefore，thattheLDP－CGPcoalitionisnotatemporary  
COOperation but a consolidated entity．If so，the LDP and the CGP  
COmbinedwillcontinuetosccureseatswelloverthemajorityintheDiet，  
establishingancwversionofthe1955system．  
Needlessto say，a partySyStemis affected，Or eVen mOlded to some  







anSMDsystemalsocanleadtoadominantpartysystemonthedistrict   
levelasonceobservcdintheSouthoftheUnitedStates．InBritain，many  
districtshavebeeninsuchone・partydominantsituation，tOO．Thereisone  
more thing that we should takeinto account when we talk about the  
Duverger’slaw．InBritain，aCOuntryOfthegenuineSMDsystem，athird  
partyhascontinuouslyparticipatedinelections onthenationwidebasis  
二 Sinceearlyinthelastcentury・Moreover・thepresentthirdparty，the  
四 LiberalDemocraticParty，hasgraduallyincreasedinitsnationwideshare  
Ofvotesince1952．InthepreviousgeneralelectionheldinMay，2005，it  
Obtainedtwenty－tWOperCentOfthevotescast，andgained62seatsinthe  
House of Commons．Weshouldstaycautiousabout theimpactofelec－  
tc．ralsystemonpartyconfigurations．Iwouldliketo，therefore，investi－  
gateintohowpartiesdocompetewitheachotherintheirdistrict．  
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Table3a Close－RaceIndexofEachElection：Runner－UpsAgainstWinners  
Class  1996  2000  
0≦C＜20  1．33  1．33  1．00   
20≦Cく40  8．33  11．00  7．67   
40≦C＜60   15．67   21．33  16．67   
60≦C＜80   30．33  27．33  28．67   
80≦Cく100   44．33  39．00  46．00   
Total   100・00  lOO・00 lOO・00   
Average   72．60   68．74   72．74   
Districts   300  300  
Runner－Up’sVotes  
Index CR   
Winner’s Votes   
Table3aindicatesthetransitionofoverallcompetitiononthedistrict  
level．Here，IuseClose・RaceIndex（IndexCR）tomeasurehowfierceor  
relaxed the contest wasin a glVen district．Theindexis the same as  
“Sekihai－ritsu，”orBest－LoserIndex．Usingthisterm，Iwouldliketopay  
moreattentiontotheintensityofcompetitioninadistrictthantothefate  
Oflosers．These tablesindicate the degree of how hard winners and  
runner－upSCOmpetedinelections．Accordingtothetable，theintensityof  
the contestsbetweentop－tWO Candidateswasmitigated alittlein2000．  
This means that there were more winners who won easier victories in 
2000thanin other elections．ln2000，the opposition camp did notfully  
recover from the damage caused by the break－up Of the NFP，New  
FrontierParty．SomeLDPcandidateswereabletoen］Oyeffortlessgames  
due totheir rivals’blunders．By2003，however，the DPJseemsto have  
SuCCeSSfullyfilledthevacuumleftbythedisbanded NFP．   
Excepttheminordecreaseinthenumberofhigh1ycompetitivedistricts  
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Table3b Close－RacelndexofEachElection：Third－PlaceCandidatesAgainst  
Winners  
class  ZO（）0   2003   
0≦Cく20   29．05   32．77   65．76   
20≦C＜40  31．42  39．53   25．76   
40≦Cく60   22．64   18，24   5・76」   
60≦Cく80   13．18   7．43   2．n3   
80≦C＜100   3．72   2．03   0．68   
Total   10（l．nn   100．00   100．00   
Average   36・52  31．53   20．59   
Districts   Z96   296   29 
Third－PlaceLCandidate’s Votes  
（ワ5）  Index CT  
Winner’s Votes   
enoughtoobtaindecentamountofvotes．SomethirdLrunnerSeVenplayed  





thereare23districtswithconfusedthreeTWayOrfour－Wayfights．   
But the number of districtswith such super．competitive situation  
decreasedrapidlyinoneelectionafteranother．In2003，90％ofthird－place  
candidatesobtainedlessthan40％ofwinners’vote．Theaverageshareof  
voteofthirdrunnerS also fe11to2（）．6％in2003from36．5％in1996．Itis  
obvious that substantialcontestis taken place only between top two  
Candidatesin most districts today．At the districtlevcl，the tendency  
towardthetwo－partySituationlookstobedominant．   
Doessuchsituationatthedistrictlevelbringaboutparallelingphenom－  
enonnationwide？Table4wi11giveananswerto thisquestion．Whatis  
mostconspicuousonthetableisJCP’sovcrwhelrningshareamongthird－  
place candidates．But thisis quite predictable．The point hereis that  
β   
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Table4 PartyLabelsofThoseCandidatesWho FinishedThirdPlace  
1996   2000  2003 
LDP  2n  4   3   
NFP  20  
DPJ  56  24   
SDP   13   30  22   
CGP  3  （）   
JCP  163  198  229   
NJSP   
LIB  11  
CON  1  3   
Others   15  3   
Independents  lO  9  23   
Totaさ 296  296   295   
aboutonethirdofcandidateswhofinishedthirdplacein1996wereofthe  
largest three parties．Besides，aS mentioned before，there were some  
COmmunists who finished third place but stillpushed thewinners very  
hard．Incontrastto1996，therewereonlyfifteencandidatesfromeither  
theLDPortheDPJwhofinishedthirdplace．Thethirdplacestatuslooks  
to be almost exclusively assigned to theJCP，the staggering SDP，the  
SocialDemocratic Party，and someindependents ornon－partisancandi－  
dates．This means that participationin the actualcompetitionin most  
districts was restricted to the LDP and the L）PJcandidatesin thelast  
election．   
Table3a，Table3b，andTable4combinedtellusthatthelastgeneral  
electionin2003broughttoJapandefactnationwidetwo－partyCOmpeti－  
tion atleastat thedistrictlevel、The next questionto be askcd hereis  
Whether the seatin each district was fought for by equally promising  
COntendersofthetwomajorparties．Ifnot，Japanmayreviveadominant－  
partysystem．  
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Table5a Close－RaceIndex of LDP Winners  
Class   1996  2000  2003   
0≦C＜20   2．37  2．26  1．14   
20≦Cく40   13．02  16，38  11．36   
40≦Cく60   16．57  28，81  22．16   
60≦Cく80   26．63   27．68   28．41   
80≦Cく100   41．42   24．86   36，93   
Total   10仇00   100．00  川0．00   
Average   69．40   61．28   67．86   
Winners   169   176   
C＝Runner－Up’s Votes／Winner’s VotesxlOO   
Table5b Close－RaceIndexofWinnersfromthe LargestOppositionParties  
「「   
Class   2000 2003   
NFP  DPJ  DPJ   
0≦Cく20  0．00  0．00   0．93   
20≦Cく40  1．06  0．00   1．87   
40≦Cく60  11．70  10，00  9．35   
6（）≦Cく80   34．04   30．00   29．91   
80≦C＜100   53．19  60．00  57．94   
Total   100・00 100・00  100．00   
Average  u  78．60   81．18   79．6   
winners   
－ 
94  80  107   
C＝Runner－Up’sVotes／Winner’sVotesxlOO  
Table5a and Table 5bindicate the competitive strength of LDP  
winnersandthatofNFP／DPJwinnersrespectively．Thesetwotablestell  
usthatLDPwinnerstendtowineasiervictoriesthanNFP／DPJwinners．  
This means candidates for secondlargest parties are more vulnerable  
JO   
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bythewinners．WhenClose－RaceIndexissmallerthan60in adistrict，  
thereisfewopportunityfortherunner－uptOberesurrectedinthePRtier．  








the LDP attheSMDlevel，eSpeCiallyinmanyofruralareas．   
ButwecanfindsomehopefulsignsfortheDPJwhenwecarefu11yread  
theresultofthelastgeneralelectionheldin2003．Table6showsthegain  
andlossofeach party．TheDPJlost13seatstotheLDP．ButtheDPJ  
deprived30seatsoftheLDP．Whatisespeciallynotableinthisrespectis  
that140fthese30DPJtriumphswerewonby“freshmen．”AnotherDPJ  
freshman defeated a conservative non－partisanincumbent，tOO．DPJ’s  
Table6 NumberofDistrictsWhereWinnersWonEasyVictories（C＜60）  
1996  2000  2003   
Tota1  76  101  76   
LDP  54  85  63   
NFP   12  
DPJ  3  8  13   
SDP  2  0  0   
CGP  
LIB  l  
CON  4   
Indepen   5  2  0   
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formerincumbentsdidgoodjob，tOO．Thus，thepartyoverrodetheLDP  
dominanceinNiigata，Chiba，Shiga，and Kyoto．Except Kyoto，these  
prefectureswercLDP’sbastionsafterthesecondWorldWar．EvenKyoto  
WaSruledbytheLDPforlongafterthedemiseofcommunistdominance．  
Bythe way，Iexcludeany“Nisei”candidate，thatis，aCandidatewho  
SuCCeeds his／her ex－incumbentfathel－Or relative，from the category of   
“freshman”in Table711）．Table8gives us theinformation about Nisei  
freshmen，SuggeSting that one of LDP’s recruiting pooIs of promlSlng  
Candidatesisnowbecominglessreliabletotheparty．AmongLDPNisei  
freshmen，the result was a tie．Inruralareas，Niseicandidates can still   
“inherit”mostpartoftheirfathers’solidsupportbasis．Needlesstosay，  
SuCh advantageis another expression ofincumbent’s advantage．But   
incumbent advantageitselfis diminishinginmetropolitan al－eas，andin  
someurbanareas．SoisNiseiadvantageinthoseareas．Actually，mOStOf  
LDP Niseicandidates were defeatedin urbanized areas．The present  
electoralsystemmakesmetropolitanandurbanareasbetterrepresented  
thanthe oldsystemdid12）．ThedecliningNiseiadvantagewillencourage  
somefreshmen fortheT）PJ．WecanseesuchrosysituationfortheDPJ  
evenin someLDP dominant regionslikeOkayama．  
In1996，Okayama prefecturewith five single－member districts was  
OVerWhelmingly dominated by the LDP．The LDP won quite easyvic－  
toriesinallthedistricts．Butitsstrengthhasbeenprovedtobeunstable：  
the shadow of the DPJ has creeping closer and closer to local LDP 
politicians．Table9aandTable9bexemplifyDPJ’sadvanceinOkayama  
11）Ishibashiand RcedprovideduswithanexcellentanalysisoftheNiseiphenome－  
non under the1955 system．MichihiroIshibashiand Steven Reed，“Second－  
GenerationDietMembersandDemocracyinJapan”，＾shnSurL，q・Vol．XXXII，No．  
4′1992．As for the rise and fallof Niseipoliticians，See also AsahiShimbun  
TokubetsuShuzaiHan，‘‘Seijikayo”（OnToday，sPolitjciansintheWorld），p・39・  
豆  Tokyo＝AsahiShimbun－Sha，20OO・  
12）FukashiHorie，“Shin・SenkyoSeidonoItotoSeika”（AimsandtheEffectsofNew  
ElectionSysteminJapan），paPerpreSentedto the annuaIconference oftheJapan  
Election StudiesAssociation，1977，Pp．45．Asfor’theoverrepresentationofrural  
elementsonmanyaspectsunderthe1955system，Seealso，TakuSugawara，“Nippon  
Seijiniokeru Nouson Baiasu”（OverwhelmhlgInfluence of RuralElements over  
JapanesePoliticsunderthe1955System）．N如on SeOiKen如u，Vo．1，No．1，2UO4．  
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Table 7 Number of Districts that Changed Their Winning Parties 
－Asthe Result ofthe2003GeneralElection”  
Table8 The Standingsof“Nisei’’Freshmen■  
Noffreshman  
LDP  18   
DPJ  4  
＊Onlythosewhoraninthesamedistrictsastheir   
fathers’or relatives’．  
＝Two ofthem wereresurrectedin the PR tier．  
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Table9a DPJ’s Advancein Okayama Prefecture：Votes gained by each  
candidateintheOkayama2nddistrict  
2000   2003   
（54．8％）   （51．3％）  （∠   1996      Kumashiro（LDP） 88，569  Kumashiro（LDP） 85，514 Kumashiro（LDP） 7                Nakagiri（DPJ）  51，551  Nakagiri（DPJ）  59，634 Tsumura（DPJ）  e  （31．9％）  （30．1％）  団   






Table9b DPJ’s Advancein Okayama Prefecture：Votes gained by each  
CandidateintheOkayama4thdistrict  
1996   2000   2003   
Hashimoto（LDP）152，595  Hashimoto（LDP）12R，888  Iiashimoto（LDP）104，653   
（68．0％）   （65．6％）   （56．5％）   
Kato（NFP）  56，646  Kumagaya（DPJ） 46，484  Yunoki（DPJ）  66，199   
（25．8％）   （23．7％）  （35．7％）   
Kakiuchi（JCP）   15，173  Akasaka（JCP1   21，091 Higashi（JCP）   14，367   
（6．8％）   （6．1％）  （7＿8％）   





ex－prlmeminister Hashimotolost votes election by election，tOO．The  
experienceofOkayamatellsthatthcstrcngthoftheLDPinruralareais  
notasentrenchedasataglance．Infact，OkayamaLDPwaslostbythe  
DPJbyalargemargininthelastUpper Houseelectionheldin2004．   
Thenumberofresurrectedrunner－upSCanbeanotherassetfortheDPJ  
（seeTablelO）．Aswellknown，thepresentelectoralsystem allowsdual  
Candidacy．Amongcandidatesequallyranked onthe PRlist ofa party，  
betterlosersareresurrectedinPR．Nopartjes，however，Seriouslyconsid－  
ered the potentialof the resurrection systemin the first two elections  
J4   
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TablelO Number of“Resurrected’’Losers  
1996  2000  2003   
Total 85（／200）  49（／180） 112（／1鋤   
LDP  35（／70）  3（／56） 38（／69）   
NFP   0（／60）   
DPJ   24（／35）  28（／47）  71（／72）   
SDP  lO（／11）  13（／15）  3 （／5）   
CGP   1（／24）  0（／25）   
JCP   16（／24）   0（／20）   0 （／9）   
LIB  5（／18）   M．」   
■Parenthesesindicatetheentirenumber ofPRwinnersineachcategory．   




Thismeansthat theDPJplaced verystrong challengersin71districts  
WhereLDPenjoyedvictoriesinthelastelection．Moreover，manyOfthose  
resurrectedincumbents areliterally freshmen．They not only had their  
firstexperienceofcampaigninginthelastelection，butranalmostfrom  
SCratCh．Thatis，theyweregenuinenewcomerstopolitics．Seeingtheir  
fortune，mOre peOple may consider career change torun for the DPJ  
Seriously．  





traditionalstrongh01dsto other partiessuch astheDPJ．What was the  
last straw that broke the camel’s back wasits serious blunder overits  
COmmitment to the North Korea．This blunder severeJy damagedits  
ノごう   





ment affectcd domestic politics as Stockwin says．Voters’minds them，  
Selveshavechangedfromwhattheyusedtobeinthe1955systerneraaS  
Tanakapointsout．Seemingly，theLDPhasbeenabletoadaptsuchnew  
Circumstanceverywell，regainjngitsold bastions thatit oncelost．Itis  
not surprising，thcrefore，SOme reSearChers and journalistslook at the   
loomiIlg2003systcmasanotherdominantpartysystemwiththeLDPas  
thepermanentleading party．  
Putting together those potentialadvantages of the DPJmentioned  
above，however，Iwouldratherliketosaythatthechanceforatwo－party  





Ofatwo－partySyStem，ifitisnotagenuineone．AsReedsays，“SOOnerOr   
later，theelectoratewillbereadyforachange，and”kicktherascalsout“．  
When that happeIIS，the onlyalternative rascals willbe theDemocrats  
andJapanwillhave，forbetter orworse，atWO－partySyStem”13）  
TablellDoiandHerPartyintheHyogo7thDistrict（％）  
T）oi’sShare   SPDinthe  SPD in the Nationwide 
ofVotes   PRTier  PRTier  
46．6   32．2  6．4  
62，8   20．3  
40．8   10．2  9．4                    5．1   
13）Steven Reed，“EvaluatingPoJiticalReforminJapan：A MidterrllReport”．J‘密a   
neseJournaldlbli（icalScience，Vol．3．Part2，2002，p．261．  
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Note   
The frist draft of this paperissubmittedtotheannualconference of  
Association for Asian Studies heldin San Diego，California，in March，  
2004．Iwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetoparticipantswhocommented  
to mypresentationproductively．   
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